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We investigate the competitive landscape of underwriting services in the Eurobond 
market including the choice of underwriter and underwriter gross spread. We find a 
significant but declining association between the home market of the Eurobond’s 
currency of denomination and that of the lead underwriter. These bonds underwritten 
by underwriters ‘local’ to the currency also carry significantly lower underwriter 
gross spreads vis-à-vis other Eurobonds. The amalgamation of the European 
currencies into the Euro resulted in a significant shift in the competitive landscape for 
underwriting services. We find a significant portion of market shares shifted from the 
‘local’ European underwriters to non-‘local’ U.S. underwriters with the introduction 
of the Euro. Moreover, the volume of new issues rose and the gross underwriter 
spread declined significantly. Our empirical results suggest that Eurozone 
underwriters responded to the increased entry of U.S. and other Eurozone 
underwriters with aggressive discounting of the underwriter gross spread. 
 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Codes: G15 and G24. 
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Non-Technical Summary 
  Our study examines the competitive landscape for underwriting services in the 
international debt market, the Eurobond market. Prior studies argue that underwriters 
in the Eurobond market compete based on their expertise and placement strength 
specific to the Eurobond’s currency of denomination. This suggests underwriters 
‘local’ to the currency of denomination enjoy some degree of competitive advantage 
for underwriting new issues vis-à-vis other ‘foreign’ underwriters. Our study is the 
first to examine the competitive landscape for Eurobond underwriters in the light of 
‘local’ underwriter segmentation. We examine the change in market shares and 
competition for ‘local’ Eurozone underwriters due to the introduction of the Euro. 
  Our study asks the question: what is the role of the ‘local’ underwriters in the 
competition for intermediary services in the Eurobond market? How did the Euro 
change the ‘local’ European underwriter market shares and the underwriter fee? Who 
were the ‘winners’ in the Eurobond market as a result of the introduction of the Euro? 
  Our model is a two-stage estimation procedure that examines the determinants 
of the choice of a ‘local’ underwriter before and after the introduction of the Euro. 
Our findings show that larger, riskier public issues are more likely to employ a ‘local’ 
lead underwriter. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of choosing ‘local’ 
underwriters declines significantly over our sample period 1993 to 2003. 
  The second stage of our model examines the determinants of the underwriter 
fee. Interestingly, we find that ‘local’ underwriters generally charge a significantly 
lower underwriter fee vis-à-vis non-‘local’ underwriters. Moreover, our results show 
that ‘local’ Eurozone underwriters lowered fees significantly after the introduction of 
the Euro in 1999. An unforeseen result was the significant increase in market share of 
non-‘local’ U.S. investment banks in the Euro denominated Eurobond market to the 6
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detriment of ‘local’ Eurozone underwriters. We find no evidence to suggest that the 
U.S. investment banks gained this market share through price discrimination. Instead, 
we find support for a competing hypothesis that ‘local’ European underwriters cut 
fees after the introduction of the Euro. We argue that this was in response to the loss 
of ‘local’ market power in the segmented currency zones that brought the Eurozone 
underwriters into direct competition with each other and the more reputable U.S. 
investment banks. The increased competition and the loss of market power by 
eurozone underwriters helped drive competition in fees.  
  Our empirical evidence suggests that, overall, the introduction of the Euro 
lowered the barriers of entry and increased the quantity of new issues in the Eurobond 
market. The mainly European community of issuers benefited greatly from the lower 
barriers of entry and greater demand for their securities. While the demand for 
underwriting services increased overall, U.S. investment banks were successful in 
capturing a greater share in the Euro Eurobond market than the Eurozone banks.   
7
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Introduction 
  The Eurobond market is serviced by a diverse range of international banks. 
Competition in the Eurobond market is intense, and underwriters cite “excessive 
competition” as leading to thin profit margins.
1 Levich (2001, p. 352) reports elevated 
competitive conditions in the Eurobond market arguing that the top ten underwriters 
in the Eurobond market captured only 63.5% of the total market share in 1999. 
Furthermore, the author cites a diverse mix of U.K., European, U.S. and Japanese 
underwriters occupying the top ten positions in the league tables from 1978 to 1999. 
Concluding that the market for underwriters’ services is competitive based on 
evidence of aggregate underwriter concentration in the Eurobond market can be 
misleading. Instead, Balder et al (1991) suggest that underwriters in the Eurobond 
market also compete based on their expertise and placement strength in the 
Eurobond’s currency of denomination. In support, the authors find that underwriters 
are more likely to manage Eurobonds denominated in their home nation’s currency 
vis-à-vis other currencies.
2 In 2003, 56% of the volume of Euro denominated 
Eurobonds underwritten by the top twenty underwriters employed a European 
underwriter.
3 This phenomenon suggests some degree of competitive advantage for 
underwriting services in favour of underwriters ‘local’ to the currency of 
denomination (herein referred to as a ‘local’ underwriter). Our study models the 
choice of a ‘local’ underwriter and the impact of this choice on the cost of issuance, 
the underwriter gross spread.  
  Our study of the association between the nationality of the underwriter chosen 
and the pricing of underwriter services is of interest for several reasons. First, the 
                                                 
1 The Wall Street Journal, “Eurobond Market No Longer Affords Investment Banks Big Profit 
Margins”. Oct 31, 1994. 
2 Similarly, McCauley and White (1997, Table 7) find a strong correlation between the underwriter’s 
nationality and the currency of denomination. 
3 Authors calculations based on the population of non-equity linked Eurobonds in 2003.  
8
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study provides evidence on important competitive barriers of entry that affect the 
cross-currency competition of underwriters in the Eurobond market. Recent studies by 
McCauley and White (1997) and McCauley (1999) document the correlation between 
underwriter nationality and currency, and suggest that underwriters enjoy a 
competitive advantage in placing Eurobonds denominated in their home currency. 
Whilst we also find a significant relationship between the currency of denomination 
and the underwriter’s home nation, we note that the association declines from 1993 to 
2003. 
  Second, the study examines the effect of the amalgamation of the Eurozone 
currencies in 1999 on the choice of a Eurozone ‘local’ underwriter and underwriter 
spread in the legacy/Euro denominated Eurobond market. The introduction of the 
Euro worked to erode the competitive advantage of European banks underwriting 
Eurobonds in their home currencies vis-à-vis non-European underwriters. Seminal 
studies by Detken and Hartmann (2000) and Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) document 
the increased volume of new issues, a decline in underwriter gross spreads and the 
increased contestability of the Eurobond market due to the introduction of the Euro.   
Our results of the choice of underwriter are generally consistent with these 
observations, as the probability of using a ‘local’ European underwriter to place 
legacy/Euro denominated Eurobonds declines significantly after 1999. However, we 
find that increased competition between Eurozone underwriters, rather than the entry 
of U.S. underwriters, resulted in the decline in underwriter gross spreads. Our findings 
are in contrast to Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) who suggest that the new entrant U.S. 
underwriters were associated with the decline in underwriter gross spreads. 
  Finally, the study is of interest as it develops the existing models of underwriter 
spreads by incorporating endogenous underwriter choice. Jewell and Livingston 
(1998) and Livingston and Miller (2000) assume exogenous contract choice and  
9
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exogenous underwriter choice terms in their models of the underwriter gross spread. 
While Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999) and Livingston and Zhou (2002) incorporate 
endogenous selection of the underwriter type and placement type in their model, they 
do not focus their analyses on these determinants. Our study provides a detailed 
analysis of the determinants of the underwriter choice and incorporates the estimated 
underwriter choice as a determinant of the underwriter spread.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section One briefly 
describes the Eurobond market, the issuance process and the studies that document 
the competitive landscape in the Eurobond market. In Section Two, we develop the 
model for the determinants of the underwriter choice and the underwriter spread. The 
data and summary statistics are described in Section Three while regression results are 
reported in Section Four. Section Five summarizes the principal findings and suggests 
topics for ongoing research. 
 
1.  The Eurobond Market 
  The first Eurobond issue was in 1957 by Petrofina, a Belgian petroleum 
company for the small amount of $5 million. Issuers were attracted to the Eurodollar, 
the U.S. Dollar denominated Eurobonds, as an alternative to foreign bonds issued in 
the U.S. domestic market that carry disclosure costs and excise taxes.
4 Panel A of 
Table I shows the volume of new non-equity linked Eurobond issues from 1990 to 
2003. The Eurobond market saw rapid expansion in the 1990s, averaging an annual 
growth of 18.4% from 1990 to 2000, and slowing to an average of 3% growth in 
volume from 2000 to 2003. Similarly, Levich (2001, pp. 337) reports an average 
growth from 1979 to 1999 of 20% p.a. 
                                                 
4 The introduction of the interest equalization tax (IET) in 1963 greatly increased the cost of funds for 
foreign borrowers in U.S. domestic markets. While the IET program was later scrapped in 1974, the 
Eurobond market survived and continued to grow.  
10
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  Eurobonds differ from foreign bonds in that a Eurobond issue may be 
denominated in any currency, and is often sold across a range of markets 
simultaneously.
5 The primary currency of denomination has traditionally been the 
U.S. Dollar followed by the European currencies and the Yen. Detken and Hartmann 
(2000) and Detken and Hartmann (2002) document the important role of the Euro in 
the international financial markets. The authors show that the Euro overtook the U.S. 
Dollar briefly in 1999, and settled as the second most widely used currency behind the 
U.S. Dollar for international financing. 
  Eurobonds are underwritten by a lead underwriter(s) and a syndicate of 
international banks assist in the marketing and sale of the new security. The issuing 
entity sets the contract characteristics of the Eurobond such as tenure, size and other 
characteristics. The lead underwriter(s) is chosen through a competitive tender to sell 
the issue.
6 In the case of a ‘bought deal’
7, the lead underwriter buys the entire issue 
from the issuer. In syndicated offerings, the Eurobonds are sold using the ‘fixed-price’ 
method to avoid under-pricing by syndicate members to favoured clients.
8  
 
1.1.   Competition in the Eurobond Market 
  The Eurobond markets are generally regarded as very competitive (Levich 
(2001, p351)). However, aggregate league tables may provide misleading conclusions 
in a market with heterogeneous products. Agents that are specialised in certain 
segments of the Eurobond market are naturally more competitive vis-à-vis other 
                                                 
5 While not domiciled in any one country, secondary market over the counter (OTC) trading of 
Eurobonds is usually based in London, New York and Luxemburg. See Esho, Kollo and Sharpe (2004) 
and Kollo and Sharpe (2004) for an overview of the Eurobond market. 
6 The competitive tender may be omitted if the issuer is concerned about the speed of the issuance. 
7 This contrasts to a ‘best efforts’ underwriter contract, where the underwriter does not commit to a 
firm purchase of all the outstanding securities. Almost all Eurobonds use the ‘bought deal’ method. 
8 In ‘fixed-price’ issues, all members of the syndicate must sell the issue at the same price set by the 
lead underwriter, for which they receive a commission. Therefore, underwriters in the sales syndicate 
are not able to decrease the sale price that cuts into their fee revenue.  
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agents. Therefore, if product segments are largely captured by the agents that 
specialise in them, then aggregate measures of market share will most likely show the 
share of product segments rather than agents.  
  Balder et al (1991) argue that currency of denomination is an important source 
of product heterogeneity in the Eurobond market. They show a strong positive 
correlation between the currency of denomination and the lead underwriter’s 
nationality from 1985 to 1989. The authors interpret their findings as evidence of 
competitive advantages in the production of underwriting services across the currency 
of denomination. They suggest that underwriters enjoy a competitive advantage in 
placing issues denominated in their home market currency vis-à-vis other currencies.  
The competitive advantage enjoyed by underwriters placing issues in their home 
currencies is due to (i) investor preferences for domestic currency securities and (ii) 
the dominant market position enjoyed by underwriters in their local markets (Denaus 
(1996).  
  Firstly, investor preferences for home currency securities are supported by the 
observed portfolio weights of large domestic institutional investors and documented 
in the ‘home-bias’ literature. Lannoo (1998) reports that pension funds in the U.S. 
invested ten percent of their portfolio in foreign assets, while German pension funds 
held less than six percent. Similarly, Roldos (2004) reports pension funds investments 
in foreign assets accounted for eleven percent of portfolio holdings in the U.S., and 
only five and seven percent in France and Germany respectively in 2001-02. The 
‘home bias’ or under-diversification observed in the portfolio allocation of large 
domestic institutional investors suggests that currency of denomination is an 
important factor in determining investor base for new securities. Moreover, studies by 
Stehler (1977) and Adler and Dumas (1983) document ‘home-bias’ by domestic 
investors in foreign securities denominated in foreign currencies. Similarly, Kim and  
12
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Stultz (1988) argue that clientele effects in the investor base allow large U.S. 
corporations to borrow in the Eurobond market at a lower cost of capital relative to 
issuing in their domestic market.  
  Secondly, ‘local’ underwriters’ competitive advantage is further enforced by 
their dominant market share of their home market relative to foreign underwriters. De 
Nicolo et al (2003) reports the mean asset share controlled by domestic banks as 87 
percent in the North American markets, and 68 percent on average for countries in 
Western Europe in 2000. The dominant position of domestic banks in their home 
markets suggests greater access to domestic investors relative to other nationality 
underwriters. In summary, segmented investor preference and the dominant position 
of underwriters in their home markets provide a natural competitive advantage to 
underwriters placing Eurobonds denominated in their home market’s currency. 
 
1.2. The Introduction of the Euro 
  The introduction of the Euro in 1999 reduced the level of competitive advantage 
enjoyed by European underwriters by (i) amalgamating the investor base for Euro 
denominated Eurobonds and (ii) increasing the entry of non-European underwriters 
into the Eurozone currency segments of the Eurobond market. Santos and Tsatsaronis 
(2003) and Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003) argue that the introduction of the Euro 
opened the entry of U.S. investment banks into the Euro segment of the Eurobond 
market, increasing the contestability of the Euro denominated Eurobond underwriting 
market. Figure 1 shows the percentage market shares of U.S., Eurozone, Ex-Eurozone 
European
9 and Japanese underwriters for the Eurozone currency denominated 
Eurobonds issued by non-financial firms from 1993 to 2003. The increased entry of 
                                                 
9 Ex-Eurozone European underwriters are those from European nations that did not adopt the Euro. For 
example, U.K and Swiss underwriters. 13
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U.S. investment banks into the Eurozone currency segment is especially evident at the 
introduction of the Euro in 1999, consistent with the authors arguments. Galati and 
Tsatsaronis (2003) argues that the increased entry of U.S. investment banks increased 
the contestability of underwriter services in the Eurobond market. Our study seeks to 
refine this observation by differentiating the choice and pricing of ‘local’ and non-
‘local’ underwriters pre and post the Euro in 1999. 
 
1.3. Underwriter Compensation 
  An important cost of capital for new issues in the Eurobond market is the 
underwriter gross spread.
10 The underwriter gross spread is the price of the 
underwriting service and varies with the default risk of the issue, the maturity of the 
issue, the issue size, the reputation of the lead underwriter and other institutional 
characteristics of the issue (see Jewell and Livingston (1998), Gande et al (1999), 
Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000), Livingston and Miller (2000), Livingston and Zhou 
(2002) and Rotten and Mullineaux (2002)).  
  Market studies of the Eurobond underwriter spreads have largely been neglected 
by the U.S. domestic market focused academic literature.
11 A small number of studies 
focused on the Eurobond market find the underwriter spread is generally higher than 
in the U.S. domestic market. Moreover, the underwriter spread has seen a significant 
decline in the late 1990’s, especially pronounced for Eurobonds denominated in 
legacy currencies (Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003), Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003), 
Kollo and Sharpe (2004) and Melnik and Nissim (2003)).  
                                                 
10 The underwriter compensation is expressed as a ‘spread’, or percentage of the issue size and is paid 
to the underwriter on agreement of the deal. This is distinct to the more commonly used variant of the 
term ‘spread’ to signify secondary market makers spread between the bid and ask price. We may 
consider the ‘underwriter spread’ as the difference between the price the issuer sells the bonds to the 
underwriter and the price at which the underwriter sells the issue to the market. 
11 See studies by Esho, Kollo and Sharpe (2003) and Kollo and Sharpe (2004) for a discussion of the 
unique determinants of underwriter spreads in the Eurobond market.  
14
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  Figure 2 shows the average underwriter gross spread for Eurozone, ex-Eurozone 
European and the U.S. Dollar currency denominated Eurobonds issued by non-
financial firms. Consistent with Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003, p 184), the figure shows 
a clear negative trend in underwriter spreads for all currency segments except the U.S. 
Dollar. The authors argue that the decline in underwriter spreads is due to lower costs 
of research and distribution for Euro denominated Eurobonds and a corresponding 
boom in bond issuance over the 1998 to 2001 period.  
  Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) argue that the lower underwriter gross spreads are 
a result of competitive changes due to the increased entry of U.S. investment banks 
into the Eurobond underwriting market. Figure 3 shows the average underwriter gross 
spread (%) for fixed/straight Eurobonds denominated in the legacy currencies pre-
1999 and the Euro post 1999. The average underwriter gross spread was lower for 
Eurobonds underwritten by European underwriters vis-à-vis U.S. underwriters post 
the introduction of the Euro in 1999, 2000, and 2001. Our study provides evidence on 
the difference in pricing of underwriter services post the introduction of the euro by 
U.S. and European underwriters. Our study builds on the authors findings by 
explicitly differentiating between the increased competition from non-‘local’ (U.S.) 
and ‘local’ (European) underwriters post the introduction of the Euro in 1999. 
 
2   Model  
  Our model examines the effect of the choice of the underwriter on the 
underwriter gross spread. The model is estimated as a two-stage system of equations, 
where the first-stage Logit estimates of the underwriter choice are included in the  
15
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second-stage ordinary least squares regression of the underwriter gross spread.
12 The 
first stage and second stage are as follows: 
                
  
              
 Where  Yi is the dichotomous variable of the choice of an underwriter of the 
same nation as the domestic market of the currency of denomination (a ‘local’ 
underwriter). The Zi are the determinants of the ‘local’ underwriter choice. The Wi is 
the underwriter gross spread, the Ŷi is the estimated continuous
13 underwriter choice 
from equation one, while Xi are the determinants of the underwriter gross spread. 
  Our model relies on two important assumptions. First, we assume that the issue 
characteristics included in Zi
14 are independent of the underwriter choice.
15 Smith and 
Walter (1997) suggest that some of the characteristics of the new Eurobond issue may 
be altered on advice of the lead underwriter to take advantage of favourable market 
conditions. In this case, numerous contract terms (for example maturity, currency and 
placement type) may be determined simultaneously with the choice of underwriter. 
The decision to assume Zi as exogenous to the model is based on the lack of 
theoretical literature that provides guidance as to which of the contract terms may be 
determined by the underwriter and which by the issuer. This assumption simplifies the 
analysis and allows us to examine the underwriter choice consistently with the prior 
                                                 
12 Our results are unchanged by using Probit instead of Logit estimators. For ease of interpretation, we 
chose the Logit framework. 
13 We use the continuous Type I predicted underwriter choice that is a normal, continuous variable 
between zero and one [0,1]. Using the normal predicted variable (Type II) or a truncated dichotomous 
predicted variable does not qualitatively alter our results. 
14 The contract terms are defined as the size, tenure, placement type and currency of denomination of 
the issue. 
15 The most important aspect of this assumption is the choice of currency. We assume that the firm 
chooses the currency of denomination for the Eurobond to match it’s balance sheet hedging 
requirements. Therefore, the currency is a contract choice made prior and exogenously to the 
underwriter choice. 
i i i i e Z Y Y Log + + = − ) ( )) 1 /( ( 2 1 δ δ
i i i i X Y W . . . . + + + = ) ( ) ˆ ( 3 2 1 
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literature (James (1992), Gande et al (1997), Jewell and Livingston (1998), Livingston 
and Miller (2000), Krigman et al (2001) and Burch, Nanda and Warther (2004)). 
  Our second assumption is that the underwriter choice is not simultaneously 
determined with the underwriter gross spread, given the contract terms of the 
Eurobond.
16 This is primarily because the underwriter gross spread is not observed 
prior to the choice of the underwriter.
17 This assumption is consistent with the survey 
findings of Krigman et al (2001) who suggest that issuers choose underwriters based 
on a number of criteria including reputation, placement capacity, expertise in the 
security market and prior experience. While the underwriter gross spread constitutes 
an important cost of capital for issuers, it is negotiated at a later stage of the offering, 
subsequent to the choice of underwriter. Uttal (1986) provides institutional evidence 
from the U.S. domestic market that underwriters are chosen long before the 
underwriter gross spread is determined. Our model of the underwriter choice and 
gross spread is consistent with the institutional evidence and the models of James 
(1992) and Burch, Nanda and Warther (2004). 
 
2.1. ‘Local’ Underwriter Choice 
  We proxy the choice of underwriter as a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value of unity if the lead underwriter’s parent’s home nation is the currency’s home 
nation, and zero otherwise, ‘CURR_UW’.
18 We model this ‘local’ underwriter choice 
as a function of (i) the issue size and liquidity (ii) the default risk and maturity, (iii) 
placement type of the new issue and (iv) controls for the currency of issue, time-trend, 
                                                 
16 In econometric terms, this means that Wi is not a subset of Zi. 
17 While expectations of the underwriter gross spread may impact the choice, these are not sufficient to 
impact the choice of underwriter significantly. 
18 In the case of multiple lead underwriters, if any of the lead underwriter’s parents are of the same 
nation as the currency’s domestic nation, we define CURR_UW as unity. Without a clear single 
investor base or home nation for European Currency Unit issues, we define CURR_UW as zero for all 
ECU issues.  
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(3) 
the home currency of the issuer’s parent and issuer parent’s industry.
19 The model is 
specified as follows: 
 
         
 
 Where  SIZE refers to the issue size, LIQUIDITY is the measure of liquidity in 
the Eurobond’s currency segment, DEFAULT is the default risk of the issue, 
MATURITY is the maturity of issue and PLACEMENT are the placement 
characteristics of the issue.  
2.1.1.  Size and Liquidity 
    Large issues are likely to require greater placement expertise by the lead 
underwriter. Underwriters ‘local’ to the currency of denomination are more likely to 
possess the necessary placement capacity to successfully sell larger issues. We expect 
the size of the issue to have a direct relationship with the choice of a ‘local’ 
underwriter. We proxy the underwriter’s required placement capacity with the real 
U.S. Dollar tranche issue amount, ‘ISSUE_SIZE’.
20 However, as it is not clear that 
this relationship is linear, we include the quadratic form of the real issue size, 
‘ISSUE_SIZE^2’.  
  Less liquid Eurobond issues are more likely to require the expertise of an 
underwriter ‘local’ to the currency of denomination. Our measure of liquidity is the 
average investor demand for corporate Eurobonds in the currency of denomination, 
                                                 
19 Issuers and underwriters are always identified on the parent level. Our decision reflects the 
multinational nature of the issuing firms and underwriters. 
20 Issue size is reported by Thomsons in U.S. Dollars and deflated by the US General CPI Index to 
constant 1995 dollars. The issue amount is censored at the 1% and 99% percentiles due to the presence 
of outlier observations. Although we are not able to directly check each of these observations, it is 
likely that these are as a result of Thomsons errors in variables. Moreover, the issue size is scaled by 
10,000 for ease of reporting. Using the natural log of issue size in place of censoring does not 
qualitatively alter our results.  
i CONTROLS PLACEMENT





) ( ) (
) , ( ) , ( = i UW CURR_ 
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‘CURR_VOL’.
21 It is calculated as the cumulative sum of the real issue amounts of 
all corporate Eurobond denominated in the issue’s currency of denomination, issued 
over the twelve months immediately preceding the current issue date.
22 We expect an 
inverse relationship between ‘CURR_VOL’ and the choice of a ‘local’ underwriter to 
reflect the significance of the ‘local’ underwriters’ expertise in placing issues 
denominated in less liquid currency segments. 
2.1.2.  Default Risk and Maturity 
    Denaus (1996) argues that the expertise of ‘local’ underwriters arises from 
their superior default risk evaluation and pricing of issues denominated in their home 
currencies. Lower rated issues are generally more difficult to certify and require 
greater expertise in pricing and marketing to new investors. To capture the effect of 
default risk of the issue on the choice of underwriter, we include three indicator 
variables, ‘INVGR’, ‘SUBINVGR’, and ‘NR_RATE’ to proxy investment grade, sub-
investment grade, and ‘Not-Rated’ Eurobonds respectively. We exclude the 
‘SUBINVGR’ variable to avoid singularity and omit the sub-investment grade 
category as a base for comparison. We expect that issuers are more likely to value the 
‘local’ underwriters expertise for lower rated issues, and therefore a negative 
relationship between the ratings dummies ‘INVGR’ and ‘NR_RATE’ and the 
likelihood of using a ‘local’ underwriter. We include the natural log of the years to 
maturity, ‘LN(MAT)’, to proxy the investment risk of new Eurobond issues as 
suggested by Jewell and Livingston (1998), Livingston and Miller (2000) and Gande 
                                                 
21 We use only Eurobonds issued by non-financial firms to calculate ‘CURR_VOL’. We therefore 
assume that demand for Eurobonds is in part segmented across the issuer types (i.e. banks, corporate 
and supranational/government issuers). This assumption is mirrored in our overall sample selection and 
is supported by Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003). Finally, ‘CURR_VOL’ is scaled by 10,000 for ease of 
reporting.  
22 For Euro denominated Eurobond issues in 1999, we calculate the cumulative sum including 
European Currency Unit issues in 1998. 19
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et al (1997). We expect a positive relationship between the maturity of the Eurobond 
and the choice of a ‘local’ underwriter. 
2.1.3. Placement  Type 
  Eurobonds can be offered as either private placements or public offerings. 
Private placements are marketed directly to large institutional investors and are 
generally smaller in size, require lower disclosure, and are faster to place.
23 Public 
issues are sold to a wider range of investors, involve an expensive road-show and 
more extensive efforts by the underwriter to solicit investor interest vis-à-vis private 
placements. It is not clear how the higher distribution capacity of ‘local’ underwriters 
differs across private institutional investors and the general pool of public issue 
investors. We include an indicator variable to control for the institutional differences 
between private and public placements that takes the value of unity for private 
placements and zero for public issues, ‘PRIV_PL’. The relationship between 
placement type and the ‘local’ underwriter choice is unknown. 
  A security under the Rule 144a placement category is unlisted and may be sold 
directly to U.S. domiciled institutional investors without SEC registration (see Levich 
(2001, p366)).  Unlike unregistered bearer bonds, Rule 144a placements may also be 
traded over the counter between institutional investors within the U.S. domestic 
market. We include an indicator variable that takes the value of unity if the issue is a 
Rule 144a placement, ‘US_R144A’. Denaus (1996) suggest that an issuer’s 
relationship with their domestic underwriter may also impact the choice of an 
underwriter. Therefore, issues targeted specifically at U.S. domestic investors are 
more likely to employ the services of a U.S. underwriter. The relationship between 
‘US_R144A’ and the ‘local’ underwriter choice is expected to be positive for U.S. 
Dollar issues, and negative for all other currency Eurobonds. 
                                                 
23 See Carey, Prowse, Rea and Udell (1993) for an extensive overview of the private placement market.  
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 550
November 2005
2.1.4. Controls 
  We control for the home currency of the issuer, the currency of denomination, 
the year of the issue and the industry of the issuer’s parent. Our definition of a ‘local’ 
underwriter is analogous with an underwriter from the issuer’s home market where 
the currency of denomination is the issuer’s home currency.
24 We control for this by 
including a home currency choice variable, ‘HOME_CURR’ that takes the value of 
unity if the currency’s domestic market is the issuer’s parent’s home nation.  
  We include indicator variables for U.S. Dollar, Eurozone
25, Euro, Yen and all 
other currencies. The coefficients control for the currency-specific effects in the 
choice of underwriter. Moreover, we control for time trend characteristics in the 
dependent variable by including indicator variables for the year of the issue. Finally, 
we include indicator variables for the issuer’s parent’s first digit of SIC industry code. 
Our variables control for currency, time and industry specific effects in the ‘local’ 
underwriter choice. 
 
2.2. Underwriter Gross Spread 
  The gross underwriter spread is the cost of intermediation for the placement of 
new bonds, and is commonly measured as the sum of the management fee, marketing 
costs, syndicate fees, and selling concession
26 divided by the issue size (Gande et al 
(1997), Jewell and Livingston (1998), Livingston and Miller (2000), Livingston and 
                                                 
24 The exception may arise for issues denominated in Euros and in the case of multiple underwriters. 
For example, a French company issuing Euro denominated Eurobonds that uses a German underwriter. 
In this case, the underwriter is local to the currency (UW_CURR=1) but not of the same nation as the 
issuer. Moreover, issuers may use multiple lead managers that overlap in categories. As in the previous 
case, if the French company used two lead underwriters, one German and one French. 
25 We define Eurozone currencies as those that were replaced by the EURO in 1999. For example, we 
do not include Swiss Francs and Pound Sterling, but do include German Marks, French Franks, Italian 
Lira, Spanish Peso and the European Currency Unit. 
26 A selling concession is offered as payment to the selling group (including the lead underwriter) for 
placing the issue and is the difference between the price the underwriter pays for the issue and the price 
it sells the issue to investors. Even in the presence of a syndicate of underwriters, the lead underwriter 
generally takes on a large percentage of the issue. For a detailed review of the underwriter spread 
components in the U.S. domestic market see Torstila (2001). 21
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(4) 
Zhou (2002) and Burch, Nanda and Warther (2004)). We define the dependent 
variable as the underwriter gross spread, ‘UW_SPREAD’. The regression estimates 
the relationship between underwriter spread and the (i) the choice of underwriter local 
to the currency of denomination, (ii) the currency segment’s liquidity, (iii) the 
underwriter competition, (iv) the underwriter reputation, (v) default risk and maturity, 
and (vi) placement type. Moreover, the regression controls for the issuer’s home 
currency, time-trend, issue size, infrequent issuers, call options on the Eurobonds, the 
currency of denomination, and the underwriter’s parent’s nationality. The model is 




2.2.1. ‘Local’ Underwriter Choice 
  Underwriters may have superior placement capacity in their home currencies 
vis-à-vis other currencies and therefore face lower distribution costs. The choice of a 
‘local’ underwriter is expected to result in lower underwriter gross spread. In contrast, 
if the competition from non-‘local’ underwriters in the Eurobond’s currency segment 
is significantly impeded, ‘local’ underwriters are more likely to extract the lower 
distribution costs as quasi rents through higher underwriter gross spreads. The lower 
costs of the ‘local’ underwriter are reflected in the underwriter spread based on the 
competitive landscape for underwriter services within the currency of denomination.  
  The choice of a ‘local’ underwriter is proxied by the indicator variable 
‘CURR_UW’ defined in Section 2.1.1 that takes the value of unity if the underwriter 
parent’s home nation is the currency’s domestic market. As the choice of underwriter 
is likely to be endogenous to the contract characteristics of the Eurobond, we use the 
continuous predicted value, ‘Pr(CURR_UW)’, derived from the regression estimate of 
= i SPREAD UW _
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MATURITY DEFAULT f REP UW e





+ + + +
) ( ) (
) , ( ) _ (
) _ ( ) _ ( ) _ ( 
22
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 550
November 2005
 
Equation 3. Due to the contrasting hypotheses of underwriter pricing outlined above, 
the relationship between ‘Pr(CURR_UW)’ and underwriter spreads is uncertain. 
2.2.2. Currency Segment Liquidity 
  As investor demand for Eurobonds is segmented by the currency of 
denomination (Denaus (1996), Eurobonds denominated in less liquid currency 
segments face greater distribution costs. We proxy the size of the Eurobond’s 
currency segment by ‘CURR_VOL’, the currency segment’s liquidity defined in 
Section 2.1.1. We expect an inverse relationship between the currency segment size 
and the underwriter gross spread to reflect lower distribution costs for Eurobonds 
denominated in more liquid currency segments. 
2.2.3. Underwriter Competition 
  Eurobonds issued in more contested currency segments are likely to reflect 
increased competitive pressures on the underwriter gross spread. The contestability of 
underwriter services within currency segments is measured as the Herfindahl index of 
underwriter market shares within the Eurobond’s currency of denomination, 
‘UW_COMP’. We construct a Herfindahl concentration measure based on the 
underwriter’s market shares for all currency segments in the Eurobond market. The 
Hefindahl index is the sum of the squared market shares of all underwriters within 
each currency segment in the Eurobond market, defined as:
27  
                  
              ( 5 )  
  
 
                                                 
27 We calculate the Hefindahl measure across all Eurobond types and issuer categories, including 
government and supra-national. Multiple lead underwriters are given equal credit for each issue. The 
variable is scaled by 10,000 for ease of presentation. 
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  Where ‘i’ is the currency of denomination, ‘t’ is the year, and ‘j’ is the 
underwriter’s parent. ‘UW_VOL’ is the sum of the issue sizes that underwriter ‘j’ lead 
managed in year ‘t’ denominated in currency ‘i’. The maximum value of Herfindahl 
index is 10,000 for a single underwriter with a perfect 100% market share of a 
currency segment of the Eurobond market in any given year, and approaches zero for 
an infinite pool of underwriters. The variable ‘UW_COMP’ takes the value of the 
Herfindahl index of the currency of denomination for the year prior to the issue.
28 
Eurobonds denominated in more concentrated, lower competition currency segments 
will carry a higher ‘UW_COMP’ value. We expect a direct relationship between the 
concentration of underwriters and the underwriter gross spread. 
2.2.4. Underwriter Reputation 
  The underwriter’s reputation serves as a signal to the market as to the true 
quality of the issue. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that high reputation 
underwriters provide superior certification services that low reputation underwriters 
are unable to replicate.
29  
  Prior studies of underwriter spreads in U.S. debt and equity markets have used 
numerous approaches to proxy underwriter reputation: (i) Carter and Manaster (1990) 
use an integer ranking based on the underwriter’s hierarchical bracket position in new 
issue tombstone announcements; (ii) Megginson and Weiss (1991) use the 
underwriter’s market share (in dollar terms) over a prior period. Megginson and 
Weiss (1991, p. 890) find a high positive correlation between their market share proxy 
                                                 
28 For Euro issues in 1999, we use the aggregate underwriter shares across all of the legacy currencies 
that constituted the Euro in 1998, including the E.C.U. Therefore, we assume that the concentration of 
underwriters in the Euro segment in 1999 would have been similar in 1998 if the Euro had been 
introduced at that time. If there were no issues in the currency, the variable takes the value of zero. For 
multiple underwriters, we credit each underwriter equally from the proceeds amount. Santos and 
Tsatsaronis (2003) and Esho, Kollo and Sharpe (2003) construct similar measures of underwriter 
market share concentration in the Eurobond market. 
29 While the authors focus on the behaviour of underwriters in the equity market, they note that their 
model is also applicable to an asymmetrically informed debt market (Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994, 
p58)). 24
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and that of Carter and Manaster’s (1990) tombstone hierarchical bracket ranking. As a 
tombstone ranking of underwriters in the Eurobond market is not available, in this 
study we use the market share approach.
30 First, we construct underwriter league 
tables for each year 1992 to 2002. The lead underwriter’s parent of each tranche
31 is 
credited with the nominal U.S. Dollar issue amount, and the issue amounts are 
summed for each underwriter parent for each year.
32 The top twenty lead underwriter 
parents for each year are given rankings; twenty for the top underwriter, nineteen for 
the second and so forth. Underwriter parents outside the top twenty are given a 
ranking of zero. Second, for each issue, we match the lead underwriter’s ranking in 
year prior to the issue date. If the underwriter has merged with another underwriter 
within the last year, we use the highest ranking in the previous year of the two 
merging entities.
33 We expect a direct relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underwriter gross spreads to reflect the higher quality of service provided by a higher 
reputation underwriter (Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Puri (1999)).  
2.2.5. Default Risk and Maturity 
  Jewell and Livingston (1998) find that lower rated bonds carry a lower 
underwriter spread, and that this is specifically pronounced for sub-investment grade 
issues. We include the indicator variables, ‘INVGR’ and ‘NR_RATE’ defined in 
                                                 
30 One such ranking is provided by the institutional publication ‘Euromoney’ based on a survey of 
institutional investors and issuers. Unfortunately, the available survey information does not extend to 
our full sample period. With the generous contribution of the Euromoney editor, we obtained 
Euromoney rankings based on the total ranking (underwriting, advisory and research) for the lead 
underwriters in our sample for the four years 1999 –2003. We assign the lead underwriter’s Euromoney 
ranking for the previous year. The correlation of this ranking with our measure ‘UW_REP’ for issues 
from 1999 to 2003 is 0.905.  
31 We use all non-equity linked Eurobonds issued by non-financial, financial, supranational, and 
sovereign issuers over this period. 
32 For multiple lead underwriters, we split the issue amount evenly between the lead underwriters. We 
follow over 400 underwriters in the Eurobond market, including foreign subsidiaries and parent 
companies. We credit the underwriter parents manually by amalgamating all issues done by 
subsidiaries under the parent’s name.  
33 We follow and adjust over 400 underwriters through mergers over our sample period, including 
foreign subsidiaries. Fortunately, mergers between underwriters with significant league table rankings 
in the Eurobond market are rare. For example, the mergers of large investment banks like SBC and 
UBS and BNP and Paribas. Moreover, our results are qualitatively unaffected by our assumptions with 
relation to assigning credit to underwriter parents that have merged.  
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Section 2.1.3. The coefficients are measured relative to the sub-investment grade 
category and are expected to be negative to reflect lower underwriter spreads for 
higher rated issues. Moreover, we include the natural log of the years to maturity, 
‘LN(MAT)’ of the Eurobond. Longer maturity bonds carry greater risk to investors 
and therefore higher placement costs. A direct relationship is expected between 
‘LN(MAT)’ and the underwriter spread. 
2.2.6. Placement Type 
  Eurobond private placements are confined to a relatively small investor base, are 
generally unlisted, and therefore disclosure, distribution, and marketing costs are 
relatively small. Public offers require greater disclosure, a road show (dependent on 
size of the issue), and a greater marketing effort. A public offer often requires a large 
underwriting syndicate resulting in greater costs for the lead underwriter in managing 
syndicate members (Chen and Ritter (2000)). These administrative and management 
costs are expected to add to the distribution costs of a public offer and result in higher 
underwriter spreads.
34 We proxy the placement costs for the underwriter by including 
an indicator variable, ‘PRIV_PL’, that takes the value of unity for private placements 
defined in Section 2.1.4. The relationship between ‘PRIV_PL’ and underwriter 
spreads is expected to be negative to reflect lower fees for private placements vis-à-
vis public issues of Eurobonds. 
2.2.7. Controls 
  The choice of an underwriter local to the currency of denomination is usually 
equivalent to the choice of an underwriter from the same nation as the issuer if the 
Eurobond is denominated in the issuer’s home currency. In these cases, the 
                                                 
34 There is an important distinction in the use of the terms “private placement” and “public offering” 
between the Eurobond and U.S. domestic markets. For Eurobonds the term “private placement” refers 
to the distribution technique used to place the bonds, not a Rule 144A exemption as in U.S. markets. 
Thus a private placement of Eurobonds is “an offer of securities made to a limited number of investors 
or a single investor (and which are) generally not listed” (Fisher (1988, p. 222))  
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underwriter choice also captures the effect of using the issuer’s domestic underwriter. 
We control for the effect of using an underwriter local to the issuer’s home nation by 
including the indicator variable ‘HOME_CURR’ defined in Section 2.1.5.
35 
  Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003), Kollo and Sharpe (2004) and Esho, Kollo and 
Sharpe (2004) find a negative time trend in underwriter gross spread in the Eurobond 
market. We include a time trend control variable, ‘YEAR’ that takes the value of the 
year of the issue. We expect a negative coefficient for ‘YEAR’, in evidence of 
declining underwriter spreads in the Eurobond market. 
  We control for economies of scale in underwriting fees by including 
‘ISSUE_SIZE’ defined in Section 2.1.1. (Altinkiliç and Hansen (2002)). In the 
presence of economics of scale, we expect a negative relationship between issue size 
and the underwriter gross spread. We include an indicator variable for new issuers, 
‘NEW_ISSUER’ that takes the value of unity if the issuer has not issued any 
Eurobonds over the past three year period. Kollo and Sharpe (2004) find a positive 
and significant relationship in their corporate sample between new issuers and 
underwriter spreads. We include the indicator variable ‘CALL_OPTION’ that takes 
the value of unity if the Eurobond carries a call option (Jewell and Livingston (1998) 
and Livingston and Miller (2000)). The presence of a call option decreases the 
effective maturity of the Eurobond and is therefore expected to have a negative 
relationship with the underwriter spread. 
  Finally, we include indicator variables for the currency of denomination and the 
underwriter’s parent’s nationality.
36 Our control variables control for currency and 
nationality fixed effects in the underwriter gross spread.  
                                                 
35 A different way to control for this effect is to include an indicator variable if the issuer’s home nation 
is the underwriter’s home nation. For consistency with the underwriter choice model, we use 
‘HOME_CURR’. The results are qualitatively unaffected by this choice. 
36 For multiple lead underwriters, the indicator variable takes the value of unity if any of the lead 
underwriters are of the proxied nationality.  
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3  Data and Summary Statistics 
  Our sample of straight/fixed-rate Eurobonds issued by industrial firms between 
January 1993 and December 2003 is drawn from Thomsons Deals.
37 Industrial firms 
are chosen to provide a homogeneous sample of issuers, following the previous U.S. 
domestic bond studies of underwriter spreads by Gande et al (1997), Jewell and 
Livingston (1998) and Livingston and Miller (2000). Financial firms are excluded due 
to their internal placement capacity that may bias the underwriter choice. We include 
only straight/fixed-rate Eurobonds to control possible heterogeneity due to the 
institutional differences in the security type. Panel A of Table 1 shows that fixed-
income issues comprised a majority (70.2%) of the total volume of non-equity linked 
Eurobond issues from 1993 to 2003. Our sample selection criterion captures an 
economically significant part of the Eurobond market. 
We treat multiple tranches of a single deal as separate observations if their issue 
characteristics and/or underwriter spreads are different. Initially, our sample consisted 
of 4920 non-equity linked fixed-rate Eurobonds issued by non-financial firms that met 
this criterion. We exclude a further 238 observations due to missing underwriter 
spreads, 28 due to missing ratings, 9 due to missing maturity, 5 due to missing issue 
size and a further two due to missing underwriter parent information. We exclude four 
observations with the implausibly high underwriter spreads of 22.42%, 42.09%, 
93.92% and 165%. The final sample consists of 4634 Eurobonds issued by 925 non-
financial issuers from 48 different nations. Of the Eurobonds in our sample, 22% 
denominated in U.S. Dollars, 18% in Euro, and 32% in Japanese Yen.
38 U.S., 
European, and Japanese underwriters are the dominant nationalities, lead managing 
                                                 
37 Thomsons Deals is the same research database (SDC Platinum) used by Livingston and Miller 
(2000), Livingston and Zhou (2002) and Kollo and Sharpe (2004). 
38 Further summary statistics (unreported) show that Japanese Yen issues were generally smaller in size 
and declined significantly over the sample period.  
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32%, 37%, and 34% of issues respectively. Similarly, the dominant issuers of U.S., 
Japanese, and European origin form 83% of the Eurobond issues in the sample. 
  The summary statistics for the total sample are displayed in Table II, while 
Table III shows the sample disaggregated into Eurobonds with ‘local’ underwriters 
(CURR_UW=1) and those with non-‘local’ underwriters (CURR_UW=0). The mean 
underwriter spread in the sample is 96 basis points (bps), while the difference in mean 
underwriter gross spread for Eurobonds with ‘local’ underwriters to non-‘local’ is 34 
bps. 
  On average, 62% of Eurobonds used at least one underwriter local to the 
currency of denomination. The mean issue size for the sample of Eurobonds is 
$US178 million. This figure is slightly higher for issues underwritten by ‘local’ 
underwriters vis-à-vis non-‘local’ underwriters, at $US186 million and $US165 
million respectively. The average twelve month volume of new issues in the currency 
of denomination is $US30,171 million while the mean Herfindahl index of 
concentration is a low 930 (CURRVOL=0.0930), which suggests that the 
environment for Eurobonds is generally very competitive.
39 The average league table 
rank of the lead underwriter is 9.22 with Eurobonds that used a ‘local’ underwriter 
employing on average lower reputation underwriters at a mean rank of 8.00 vis-à-vis 
non-‘local’ underwritten Eurobonds of 11.22. The differences suggest that ‘local’ 
underwriter expertise and a more general underwriter reputation may act as substitutes 
for one another. Eurobonds are generally issued by high rated firms, reflected in the 
5% of the Eurobonds rated sub-investment grade. This is in contrast with U.S. 
domestic market studies by Jewell and Livingston (1998) and Livingston and Miller 
(2000) that report 22% and 18% of their sample below investment grade. Private 
                                                 
39 Populations are classified as low concentration for Herfindahl values below 1,000; medium 
concentration for values between 1,000 and 1,800; and highly concentrated for values above 1,800 (see 
Department of Justice website).   29
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 550
November 2005
placements of Eurobonds are 22% of the sample, while only 1% of bonds have a call 
option attached. Private placements constitute 21.8% of the total sample, the majority 
of which used a ‘local’ underwriter (778 vis-à-vis 230 issues). 
 
4. Results 
4.1  . ‘Local’ Underwriter Choice Results 
  The empirical results for the ‘local’ underwriter choice are reported in Table IV. 
The base model is estimated using Logit regression and reported in REG 1. The 
Pseduo R
2 is 0.23, suggesting a generally good explanatory power of the model, while 
the .
2 is 941, significant at the 99% confidence level. The model estimated for the 
Eurobonds denominated in pre-Euro legacy currencies, the Euro, and the U.S. Dollar 
is reported in REG 2, REG 3, and REG 4 respectively. The significant .
2 for all of the 
models suggest that the choice of an underwriter local to the currency is significantly 
related to our model variables. 
4.1.1. Issue Size and Liquidity 
  The coefficient of the measure of issue size, ‘ISSUE_SIZE’, is positive and 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. The result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that larger sized issues require greater placement capacity and are more 
likely to employ the services of a ‘local’ underwriter.
40 The positive coefficient is 
consistent across all currency segments, except the U.S. Dollar where it is positive but 
not significant at the 90% confidence interval. The relationship between issue size and 
the choice of local underwriter is quadratic for legacy denominated issues pre-1999, 
where very large issues are less likely to use a ‘local’ underwriter than medium sized 
                                                 
40 Our sample consists of individual tranches of Eurobond issues that may belong to a larger single 
deal. As the choice of a local underwriter is determined at the deal level, we observe only a single 
underwriter choice for a issues with multiple tranches that may vary in issue size. We address this by 
excluding all multiple tranche observations (N=858) from our base model. Our results are not 
significantly affected by excluding multiple tranche observations.  
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 550
November 2005
issues. Moreover, this effect is not significant for Euro denominated issues. The result 
suggests that European underwriters in the Eurozone were generally unsuccessful in 
underwriting very large Eurobond issues denominated in their home currencies. The 
European underwriters appear to have gained the ability to place very large issues 
denominated in Euros after 1999, similar to U.S. underwriters for U.S. Dollar issues. 
  The regression coefficient for liquidity, ‘CURR_VOL’, is negative and not 
significant in the base REG 1 and is negative and significant at the 95% confidence 
interval for Eurobonds denominated in legacy currencies reported in REG 2. The 
result implies that more liquid currency segments of the legacy currency Eurobond 
market were less likely to employ the services of a ‘local’ European underwriter. 
Moreover, it implies that the issue volume was largely generated by Eurobonds 
managed by non-‘local’ underwriters. This is consistent with the negative coefficient 
of ‘ISSUE_SIZE^2’ that suggests that very large issues in the legacy currency 
segment of the Eurobond market are more likely to employ the services of a non-
‘local’ underwriter. Finally, this relationship is not significant post-1999 in the Euro 
segment of the Eurobond market or in the U.S. Dollar Eurobond market.   
4.1.2. Default Risk and Maturity 
  The coefficients for ‘INVGR’ and ‘NR_RATE’ are both positive and 
significant, suggesting that investment-grade Eurobonds are more likely to employ a 
‘local’ underwriter vis-à-vis sub-investment grade Eurobonds. This is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that sub-investment grade issuers require greater overall 
placement strength and are therefore more likely to use a ‘local’ underwriter. Our 
results may due to insufficient variation in the sub-investment grade and investment 
grade samples. In their U.S. domestic bond sample, Jewell and Livingston (1998) note 
that underwriting risk increases with default risk exponentially only within the sub- 
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investment grade category. While their sample contained approximately 22.4%
41 sub-
investment grade bonds, our sample contains only 4.70% which reflects the high 
quality issuers in the Eurobond market. The observed relationship between default 
risk and the choice of a ‘local’ underwriter is primarily driven by the Euro 
denominated Eurobonds reported in REG 3.  
  The natural log of maturity, ‘LN(MAT)’, is positive and significant indicating 
that longer maturity Eurobonds are more likely to use a ‘local’ underwriter. The result 
is consistent with longer maturity Eurobonds requiring the greater placement strength 
afforded by underwriters in their local currencies.  
4.1.3. Placement Type 
The coefficient of the private placements indicator variable, ‘PRIVPL’, is 
negative and significant at the 90% confidence level, suggesting that public issues of 
Eurobonds are more likely to employ ‘local’ underwriters vis-à-vis private 
placements. Our results indicate that the expertise of ‘local’ underwriters is more 
important to place public issues vis-à-vis private placements. There is insufficient 
variability in private placement in our sample of legacy denominated Eurobonds, and 
thus ‘PRIVPL’ is excluded from REG 2. The coefficient of ‘PRIVPL’ is negative and 
significant at the 95% confidence interval for U.S. Dollar Eurobonds, but not for Euro 
denominated Eurobonds.  
4.1.4. Controls   
  The coefficient of the control variable for the issuer’s home currency 
Eurobonds, ‘HOME_CURR’, is positive and significant. The results suggest the 
presence of a relationship between the choice of an underwriter local to the currency 
and the choice of an underwriter local to the issuer’s home nation. This result is 
                                                 
41 Jewell and Livingston (1998) report 16 observations with split ratings that are on the investment 
grade cut-off of BBB- (Baa3). We do not count these as sub-investment grade issues.  
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especially pronounced for legacy and Euro denominated Eurobond issues but not for 
U.S. Dollar issues. We control for the effect of issuers domestic relationships with 
underwriters on the choice of a local underwriter in the second stage underwriter 
gross spread regressions. 
 
4.2   Underwriter Gross Spread Results 
  The empirical results for the underwriter gross spread are reported in Table V 
and Table VI. The base model is estimated using multivariate Ordinary Least Squares 
and reported in REG 1 of Table V. The adjusted-R
2 is 0.48 consistent with the those 
found in previous Eurobond market models of underwriter spreads of 0.243 in Esho, 
Kollo and Sharpe (2003) and 0.476 in Kollo and Sharpe (2004). 
4.2.1 Choice of ‘Local’ Underwriter 
  The predicted continuous choice of a ‘local’ underwriter, ‘Pr(CURR_UW)’, is 
negative and statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. The coefficient 
value suggests an economically significant maximum
42 35bps discount for Eurobonds 
that employ the services of a ‘local’ underwriter as the lead manager. The results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that ‘local’ underwriters face lower underwriting costs 
that are reflected in lower underwriter gross spreads. We explore the robustness of 
this result by interacting ‘Pr(CURR_UW)’ with the indicator variable for (i) private 
placements, (ii) underwriter reputation and (iii) the home currency indicator variable. 
  The interactive term for private placements, ‘Pr(CURR_UW)*PRIVPL’ is 
introduced in REG 2. The interactive term is not significant, indicating that ‘local’ 
and non-‘local’ underwriters price their services homogeneously across private 
placements and public issues.  
                                                 
42 We discuss the effect of ‘Pr(CURR_UW)’ on the underwriter gross spread as a maximum due to the 
continuous nature of the predicted probability. We set ‘Pr(CURR_UW)’ = 1 to evaluate the maximum 
effect of the ‘local’ underwriter choice.  
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  The interactive term with the underwriter reputation and home currency 
indicator variable is introduced in REGs 3 and 4 of Table V. The underwriter 
reputation interactive term, ‘Pr(CURR_UW)*UW_REP’, is positive and statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level. The coefficient of 0.012 suggests an 
economically small one basis point difference in underwriter spreads for ‘local’ 
versus non-‘local’ underwriters with the same reputation. The result suggests that 
reputable ‘local’ underwriters price their services marginally higher than non-‘local’ 
underwriter in the underwriter gross spread.  
  The home currency interactive term, ‘Pr(CURR_UW)*HOME_CURR’, is 
positive but not statistically significant. The result suggests no significant difference 
in underwriter gross spreads between ‘local’ underwriters that are also domestic to the 
issuer’s home market relative to those that are not. 
4.2.2. Currency Segment Liquidity 
  The coefficient of the currency segment liquidity variable, ‘CURR_VOL’ is 
negative and significant at the 99% confidence interval. The result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that more liquid currency segments require lower distribution effort 
and cost from the underwriter, resulting in a lower underwriter gross spread. The 
coefficient of -0.036 suggests an economically small discount of 4 bps for a difference 
of $US10,000 million between the cumulative sum of issues over the past twelve 
months of currency segments.    
4.2.3. Underwriter Competition 
  The variable for underwriter competition, ‘UW_COMP’, is positive and 
statistically significant. The result supports our hypothesis that Eurobonds issued in 
more competitive currency segments of the Eurobond market carry a lower 
underwriter gross spread. Our results contrast Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) who find 
an inverse relationship between their measure of the Herfindahl concentration of  
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underwriters and the underwriter gross spread. The authors concede that their results 
are inconsistent with their model predictions of a positive relationship. The coefficient 
of 0.983 suggests a 9.8 bp difference for Eurobonds offered in currency segments 
with 1,000 difference in underwriter Herfindahl values. For example, the underwriter 
gross spread for a Eurobond issued in a very concentrated currency segment 
(Herfindahl = 5,000) would carry a 39.2 bps higher underwriter gross spread relative 
to a low concentration currency segment (Hefindahl = 1,000).
  
4.2.4. Underwriter Reputation 
  The coefficient of the underwriter competition variable, ‘UW_REP’ is positive 
and significant at the 99% confidence level. Our results are consistent with the 
hypotheses of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Puri (1999) that more reputable 
underwriters charge a higher underwriter gross spread. We find evidence in contrast 
with Livingston and Miller (2000) that find a significant negative relationship 
between underwriter reputation and fees. The coefficient value of 0.007 suggests an 
economically small 14 bp premium between the top ranked underwriter 
(UW_REP=20) and the bottom ranked underwriter (UW_REP=0).  
4.2.5. Default Risk and Maturity 
  The indicator variables for investment grade issues, ‘INVGR’, and ‘Not-rated’ 
issues, ‘NR_RATE’, are statistically significant and negative. The coefficients suggest 
a large discount of 93 bps for investment grade issues and 87 bps for ‘Not-rated’ 
issues vis-à-vis sub-investment grade issues. The maturity risk variable, ‘LN(MAT)’, 
is positive and statistically significant. Studies of underwriter spreads in the Eurobond 
market (Esho, Kollo and Sharpe (2003) and Kollo and Sharpe (2004)) and the U.S. 
domestic market (Jewell and Livingston (1998), Livingston and Miller (2000) and 
Gande et al (1997)) also find a positive relationship between default risk, the maturity 
of bonds, and the underwriter gross spread.  
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4.2.6. Placement Type 
  The private placement indicator variable, ‘PRIVPL’, is statistically significant 
although small in size. The coefficient value of -0.011 suggests an economically small 
discount of 11 bps for private placements vis-à-vis public issues. The results support 
the model hypothesis that private placements incur lower marketing and distribution 
costs and therefore carry lower underwriter spreads. Studies by Esho, Kollo and 
Sharpe (2003) find a similar difference in underwriter spreads for their sample of 
private placements and public issues of Eurobonds.    
4.2.7. Controls 
  For brevity considerations, we limit our discussion of the controls to the issuer’s 
home currency, ‘HOME_CURR’, trend variable, ‘YEAR’, and call option, 
‘CALL_OPTION’. The coefficient of the ‘HOME_CURR’ is negative and not 
significant. The result indicates there is no significant effect of issuer’s home country 
and the currency’s home market on the underwriter spread. The coefficient of 
‘YEAR’ is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient variable suggests an 
economically significant decline of 85 bps over the ten year sample period 1993 to 
2003. The results are supportive of increasing competitive pressures in the Eurobond 
market that result in a decline of the underwriter spread.
43 Finally, the call option 
indicator variable, ‘CALL_OPTION’, is negative and significant, consistent with our 
hypothesis that call options lower the effect maturity of bonds and therefore carry a 
lower underwriter gross spread (Livingston and Miller (2000)). 
 
 
                                                 
43 For further evidence of falling underwriter gross spreads in the Eurobond market see Santos and 
Tsatsaronis (2003) for fixed rate issues and Kollo and Sharpe (2004) for floating rate notes. Our model 
examines the decline in underwriter spreads due to underwriter competition. Our model does not 
consider other factors that may have contributed to a lower gross underwriter spread such as increased 
liquidity or a boom in new issuance resulting from exogenous factors. 36
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4.2.8.  Underwriter Gross Spreads after the Euro 
  To examine the effect of increased competition in the Eurozone currency 
Eurobond segment, we introduce the legacy currency, ‘LEGACY’, and Euro 
currency, ‘EURO’, indicator variables interactively with the underwriter choice 
variable ‘Pr(CURR_UW)’. The coefficients are expected to capture the different 
pricing of underwriter services by Eurozone underwriters pre and post the 
introduction of the Euro in 1999. We include the interactive terms for legacy 
denominated Eurobonds and Euro denominated Eurobonds underwritten by U.S. 
underwriters as ‘US_UW_LEGACY’ and ‘US_UW_EURO’ respectively. Our test is 
to examine if ‘local’ Eurozone and the main non-‘local’ entrant, U.S. underwriters, 
lowered their underwriter spreads after the introduction of the Euro. The results are 
reported in REG 1 of Table V. 
  The coefficient of ‘Pr(CURR_UW)*LEGACY’ is positive and significant at the 
99% confidence interval, while the ‘Pr(CURR_UW)*EURO’ term is not statistically 
significant. The F-statistics for the test of difference between the two coefficients is 
F(1,4608) = 3.46 and significant at the 90% confidence interval. The results indicate 
that Eurozone ‘local’ underwriters decreased their underwriter gross spreads 
significantly after the introduction of the Euro in 1999. The coefficients of 
‘US_UW_LEGACY’ and ‘US_UW_EURO’ are positive and significant at the 95% 
confidence interval. The difference of coefficients is F(1,4608) = 0.02 and not 
significant indicating that the non-‘local’ U.S. underwriters did not significantly 
change the pricing of their underwriter services after the introduction of the Euro. 
  Our results are generally consistent with Figure 3 that shows the average gross 
underwriter spread U.S., Eurozone and ex-Eurozone European underwriters for legacy 
and Euro denominated Eurobonds. The results suggest that the decline in underwriter 
spread is a result of increased internal competitive pressures rather than the increased  
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entry of U.S. investment banks as argued by Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003). Our 
results find support in institutional publications like Euromoney.
44 Practitioners argue 
that second-tier European underwriters significantly under-priced their services as a 
response to the introduction of the Euro. They point to the relatively stable 
underwriter spread in U.S. Dollar Eurobond and U.S. domestic market as evidence of 
a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ not to heavily undercut underwriter gross spreads among 
the U.S. underwriters.  
  To examine the type of internal competitive pressures that resulted in the lower 
underwriter gross spread after the introduction of the Euro, we limit our attention to 
European underwriters in the Eurobond market. Our goal is to investigate the pricing 
reaction of Eurozone underwriters to the increased entry of other Eurozone 
underwriters into their currency segment.
45 Our limitation lies in the classification of 
‘local’ underwriters. After the introduction of the Euro, all Eurozone underwriters are 
classified as ‘local’ for Euro denominated issues. We are therefore unable to 
differentiate between those that acted aggressively to extended their market share 
within the Eurozone and those that reacted to defend their market share. To overcome 
this limitation, we classify Eurobonds as those issued by firms in their home 
currencies and (i) managed by underwriters from the issuing firm’s domestic market, 
‘HOMEUW’ or (ii) managed by underwriters not from the issuing firm’s domestic 
market, ‘NON_HOMEUW’. We denoted the first category as those issues where the 
underwriter consolidates his home market share and second where the underwriter is 
expanding their market share to other currency segments and/or issuers.  
                                                 
44 “Banks feel the fee-war squeeze”, May 2003, Euromoney Publications. 
45 For example, a German and French underwriter compete for Deutschemark Eurobonds. The German 
is the ‘local’ and the French is the ‘foreign’. When the Euro is introduced, the French and German 
underwriters are both ‘local’, and compete equally.  
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  It is not clear which category of underwriter lowered their underwriter gross 
spread, the ‘HOMEUW’ underwriter reacting to the increased entry of other 
underwriters or the ‘NON_HOMEUW’ underwriter acting to capture market share 
post the introduction of the Euro. We interact the two classifications with legacy and 
Euro currency indicator variables denoted ‘HOMEUW_LEGACY’, 
‘NON_HOMEUW_EURO’, ‘HOMEUW_EURO’, ‘HOMEUW_LEGACY’ to 
provide the empirical test. We limit our sample to Eurobonds denominated in legacy 
and Euro and underwritten by Eurozone underwriters (N=814). Finally, we exclude 
all deals with more than one lead underwriter to avoid biases from multiple 
nationality underwriters, leaving 366 observations. Limiting the sample is expected to 
produce a cleaner test of our coefficients.  
  The results are reported in REG 2 of Table VI. The coefficient of the 
‘HOMEUW_EURO’ is negative and significant at the 90% confidence interval. The 
F-statistics of the difference in coefficients between ‘HOMEUW_LEGACY’ and 
‘HOMEUW_EURO’ is F(1,349) = 4.76 that is significant at the 95% confidence 
interval. The results suggest that underwriters consolidating their domestic market 
issues were the first to reduce the underwriter gross spread as a reaction to the threat 
of increased competition from other Eurozone underwriters.  
  In summary, our model highlights the differences in pricing of underwriter 
services by ‘local’ and non-‘local’ underwriters pre and post the introduction of the 
Euro in 1999. Our results indicate that ‘local’ Eurozone underwriters lowered their 
underwriter gross spreads significantly and that the main entrant, the U.S. investment 
banks, did not significantly change their underwriter gross spreads. Finally, among 
‘local’ underwriters, the lower gross underwriter spread is primarily attributed to 
those that reacted to the increased entry of other Eurozone underwriters into their 
domestic market.  
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4.3 Robustness   
Chen and Ritter (2000) report a high instance of exactly 7% underwriter spreads 
in U.S. domestic initial public offers of equity. Esho, Kollo and Sharpe (2003) show a 
medium level of clustering in Eurobond underwriter gross spreads for their sample of 
fixed rate Eurobonds issued by U.S. firms between 1992 and 2002. Clustering in the 
dependent variable can bias econometric estimation methods that rely on a 
continuously and normally distributed dependent variable. To address clustering in 
the dependent variable, we construct a new dependent variable that takes the values of 
zero to five based on the percentile distributions of the underwriter spread.
46 
  The ‘ORDERED_FEE’ variable provides an ordinal ranking of underwriter 
spread, as ‘ORDERED_FEE’ = 2 represents a higher fee category vis-à-vis 
‘ORDERED_FEE’ = 3. Moreover, ‘ORDERED_FEE’ does not differentiate in the 
magnitude of the underwriter spread difference and therefore only provides a general 
measure of higher vis-à-vis lower underwriter spreads. Following Esho, Kollo and 
Sharpe (2003), the ordinal ranking variable ‘ORDERED_FEE’ is estimated using an 
ordered logit regression
47 and the results are reported in REG 3 of Table VI. The base 
multivariate model results of REG 1 Table V are supported by the ordered logit 
regression results.  
 
5  Conclusion 
We examine the effect of the choice of an underwriter local to the currency of 
denomination on underwriter gross spreads in the Eurobond market. Underwriters 
local to the Eurobond’s currency of denomination’s home market are more likely to 
                                                 
46 If ‘UW_SPREAD’ in 0% to 5% percentile, p(0,5), then ‘ORDERED_FEE’ = 0. If p(5,25) then 
‘ORDERED_FEE’ = 1, if p(25,50) then ‘ORDERED_FEE’=2, if p(50,75) then ‘ORDERED_FEE’=3, 
if p(75,95) then ‘ORDERED_FEE’=4 and if p(95,100) then ‘ORDERED_FEE’=5. 
47 The statistical package used to estimate the results is STATA (www.stata.com).  
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benefit from greater expertise and placement capacity when competing to underwrite 
the issue. There is likely to be significantly different pricing of underwriter services 
by ‘local’ and non-‘local’ underwriters. Our model employs a two-stage estimation 
technique with the Logit ‘local’ underwriter choice as the first stage and the OLS 
underwriter gross spread as the second. We have four main findings. 
  First, we find that the proportion of Eurobonds underwritten by ‘local’ 
underwriters decreases over our sample period of 1993 to 2003. Our results show that 
the likelihood of using a ‘local’ underwriter increases with the issue size, the maturity, 
and the default credit rating of new Eurobond issues. Moreover, it is more likely for 
public issues vis-à-vis private placements. Our results are generally robust within 
currency segments, though some determinants vary. Rule 144a issues are more likely 
to employ the services of a ‘local’ underwriter for U.S. Dollar issues while ‘Not 
Rated’ issues are more likely to use local underwriters for Euro denominated 
Eurobonds relative to U.S. Dollar Eurobonds. 
  Second, Eurobonds that employ a ‘local’ underwriter carry a significantly lower 
underwriter gross spread. Our results suggest that ‘local’ underwriters face lower 
distribution costs for issues denominated in their home currencies and pass these on to 
the issuer through a lower underwriter gross spread. The lower underwriter gross 
spread is invariant to placement type and the issuer’s home currency status but varies 
significantly across the reputation of the underwriter. More reputable ‘local’ 
underwriters pass on a lower amount of cost saving to the issuer in the form of gross 
underwriter spreads than less reputable ‘local’ underwriters.  
  Third, we find that underwriter gross spreads are higher for Eurobonds 
denominated in less liquid, higher underwriter concentration currency segments. Our 
results show that higher reputation underwriters charge greater underwriter gross 
spreads consistent with the trade-off model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994).   
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  Fourth, we find a significant decline in Eurozone underwriter market share for 
legacy/Euro denominated Eurobonds complimentary to a significant decline of 
underwriter gross spread post the introduction of the Euro in 1999. The decline in 
underwriter gross spread suggests that increased competition by Eurozone and U.S. 
underwriters played a significant role in the decline of the underwriter gross spread 
for Euro denominated Eurobonds. Our results show that the decline in underwriter 
gross spread was a result of discounting by Eurozone underwriters seeking to protect 
their domestic market shares. Our results are in contrast with Santos and Tsatsaronis 
(2003) who suggest that the decline in underwriter gross spreads was due to the 
increased entry of U.S. investment banks. 
Increased globalisation of banking services have most likely worked to erode the 
competitive barriers of entry enjoyed by underwriters local to the currency segments 
in the Eurobond market. Balder et al (1991) suggests that, in the absence of 
competitive advantages due to currency of denomination, issuer relationships will 
increase in significance as a determinant of the underwriter choice and underwriter 
spread. Future studies in the international debt market may further examine the nature 
of domestic and international banking relationships within the context of a single 
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Figure 1: Eurozone / Euro Denominated Eurobond Underwriter Market Share for 2118 
non-equity linked Eurobonds issued by non-financial firms denominated in the legacy 
currencies (pre 1999) and the Euro (post 1999). Market shares are allocated to the lead 
manager using the proceeds amount. In the case of multiple lead underwriters, each lead 
underwriter is credited with equal share of the issue amount. The home currency 
underwriter is where the underwriter’s home nation is the currency’s domestic market. 
The Eurozone underwriters are defined as all underwriters from home nations that 
adopted the Euro in 1999. The Ex-Eurozone European underwriters are the underwriters 
from the European nations that did not adopt the Euro. Eurobonds denominated in the 
European Currency Unit (ECU) are excluded due to their ambiguous home nationality 
classification. Source: Thomsons Deals.  
45
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 550
November 2005
Figure 2












1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Underwriter Gross Spread (%)
Eurozone Currencies Ex-Eurozone European Currencies U.S. Dollar
Figure 2: Average Underwriter Gross Spread for non-equity linked fixed/straight 
Eurobonds denominated in the Eurozone currencies, ex-Eurozone European 
currencies, and the U.S. Dollar issued by non-financial firms. The Eurozone currencies 
are those currencies that were replaced by the Euro in 1999. Ex-Eurozone European 
currencies are those European currencies that were not replaced by the Euro in 1999. 
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   Figure 3: Average Underwriter Gross Spread (%) for non-equity linked fixed/straight 
Eurobonds issued by non-financial firms denominated in the legacy currencies (pre 
1999) and the Euro (post 1999) underwritten by Eurozone, U.S. and ex-legacy European 
underwriters. Eurozone underwriters are those whose nations adopted the Euro in 1999. 
Ex-legacy European underwriters are those European underwriters whose nations did 
not adopt the Euro in 1999. Eurobonds denominated in the European Currency Unit 
(ECU) are excluded. Source: Thomsons Deals. 
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Table I 
Eurobond Market Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Eurobond Market Volume ($USD)    Panel B: Fixed-rate Eurobond 










Eurobonds   
Underwriter Gross Spread (%) 
 
Year  ($USD 
Millions) 
($USD 
Millions)  (%) Mean  (%)  N 
1990 $166,532  $126,158  75.8    1.590  936 
1991 $232,693  $214,763  92.3    1.591  1164 
1992 $252,531  $210,431  83.3    1.529  994 
1993 $356,112  $283,972  79.7    1.463  1317 
1994 $337,345  $237,063  70.3    1.275  1181 
1995 $325,069  $252,423  77.7    0.993  1724 
1996 $465,556  $350,303  75.2    1.011  2676 
1997 $515,853  $360,901  70.0    1.121  2473 
1998 $517,404  $374,980  72.5    1.064  2011 
1999 $678,995  $458,856  67.6    1.019  1846 
2000 $616,699  $365,079  59.2    0.828  1526 
2001 $641,690  $430,166  67.0    0.818  1357 
2002 $595,786  $417,335  70.0    0.852  1264 
2003 $733,444  $528,324  72.0    0.751  1105 
Total $6,435,709  $4,610,754  71.6   1.102  21574 
Panel A: figures calculated using the population of 33,450 non-equity linked Eurobonds 
distributed solely in the Eurobond market with available tranche size information. The average 
gross underwriter gross spread is calculated using the fixed-rate Eurobond sample of Panel A 
with available underwriter spread information. Source: Thomson Deals.  
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Model Summary Statistics 
  
Mean Median  Std.  









Dependent Variables               
CURR_UW 0.619  1.000  0.486  0.000  1.000  --  Negative 
Pr(CURR_UW) 0.621  1.000  0.255  0.030  0.981  --  Negative 
UW_SPREAD (%)  0.956  0.500  0.810  0.005  5.613  --  -- 
Issue Size             
ISSUE_SIZE 178.38  102.92  211.32  3.902  1134.8 Positive  Negative 
Currency Segment Liquidity            
CURR_VOL 30171.4  16543.6  34088  0.000  128657 Negative  Negative 
Underwriter Competition            
UW_COMP 0.093  0.0758  0.078  0.000  1.000  --  Positive 
Underwriter Reputation            
UW_REP  9.224 10.00 7.869  0.000  20.000 --  Positive 
Default Risk and Maturity            
INVGR 0.677  1.000  0.468  0.000  1.000  Unkown  Negative 
SUBINVGR 0.047  0.000  0.211  0.000  1.000  Control   Control 
NR_RATE 0.276  0.000  0.447  0.000  1.000  Unkown  Negative 
YTM 6.156  5.049  4.424  0.307  30.915 Unkown  Positive 
LOG(YTM) 1.628  1.619  0.612  -1.181  3.431  Unkown  Positive 
Placement Type            
PRIVPL 0.218  0.000  0.413  0.000  1.000  Unknown  Negative 
US_R144A  0.056 0.000 0.230  0.000  1.000  Unknown  -- 
Controls            
HOME_CURR 0.541  1.000  0.498  0.000  1.000  Unkown  Unknown 
YEAR 1997  1997  2.718  1993  2003  Negative  Negative 
NEW_ISSUER 0.181  0.000  0.385  0.000  1.000  --  Positive 
CALL_OPTION 0.013  0.000  0.112  0.000  1.000  --  Negative  
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Table III   
Model Summary Statistics Across ‘Local’ and Non-‘Local’ Underwriters 
 
‘Local’ Underwriter  
(CURR_UW=1)  




 N  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min Max N  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
Dependent Variables                
UW_SPREAD (%)  2877  0.825  0.769  0.005 5.613  1757 1.169  0.829  0.010 5.015 
Pr(CURR_UW) 2877  0.725  0.206  0.046 0.973  1757 0.450  0.233  0.030 0.981 
Issue Size                 
ISSUE_SIZE 2877  186.23  235.60 3.901 1134.76 1757 165.48  163.38  3.901 1134.76
Currency Segment Liquidity               
CURR_VOL 2877  32817.1  35641.6 0.000 128657 1757 25832.8  30921.1  0.000 128657
Underwriter Competition                
UW_COMP 2877  0.086  0.054  0.000 0.470  1757 0.106  0.105  0.000 1.000 
Underwriter Reputation                
UW_REP 2877  8.007  7.944  0.000 20.00  1757 11.219  7.322  0.000 20.000
Default Risk and Maturity                
INVGR 2877  0.632  0.482  0.000 1.000  1757 0.751  0.433  0.000 1.000 
SUBINVGR 2877  0.042  0.202  0.000 1.000  1757 0.054  0.226  0.000 1.000 
NR_RATE 2877  0.326  0.469  0.000 1.000  1757 0.195  0.396  0.000 1.000 
YTM 2877  6.384  4.173  0.307 30.107 1757 5.782  4.786  1.000 30.915
LOG(YTM) 2877  1.693  0.564  1.181 3.405  1757 1.521  0.670  0.000 3.431 
Placement Type                
PRIV_PL 2877  0.271  0.444  0.000 1.000  1757 0.131  0.337  0.000 1.000 
US_R144A 2877  0.061  0.240  0.000 1.000  1757 0.047  0.212  0.000 1.000 
Controls                
HOME_CURR 2877  0.683  0.465  0.000 1.000  1757 0.310  0.462  0.000 1.000 
YEAR 2877  1997.21  2.68  1993 2003  1757 1997.70  2.76  1993 2003 
NEW_ISSUER 2877  0.173  0.379  0.000 1.000  1757 0.194  0.395  0.000 1.000 
CALL_OPTION 2877  0.0149  0.121  0.000 1.000  1757 0.009  0.095  0.000 1.000  
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Table IV   
Discrete Underwriter Choice Results 
  REG 1  REG 2  REG 3  REG 4 
 






INDEPENDENT  VARIABLES  Coef  T-stat  Coef  T-stat  Coef  T-stat  Coef  T-stat 
Constant  -2.630  (-7.69)***  -3.144  (-2.13)**  -1.894  (-2.64)***  -1.597  (-1.35) 
Issue Size and Liquidity                 
ISSUE_SIZE  15.25  (2.58)***  64.24  (3.01)***  30.56  (2.56)***  25.51  (1.61) 
ISSUE_SIZE^2  -35.47  (-0.55)  -555.51 (-2.55)**  -142.32  (-1.36)  70.60  (0.34) 
CURR_VOL  -0.011  (-0.35)  -1.413  (-2.45)**  -0.015  (-0.33)  -0.094  (-0.51) 
Default risk and Maturity                 
INVGR  0.687  (3.43)***  -0.012  (-0.01)  0.821  (2.23)**  0.479  (1.22) 
NR_RATE  0.554  (2.68)***  -0.636  (-0.70)  1.847  (3.88)***  -0.807  (-1.95)* 
LN(MAT)  0.673  (10.04)*** 1.181  (3.29)***  -0.078  (-0.39)  0.547  (3.06)***
Placement Type                 
PRIVPL  -0.217  (-1.86)*      -0.281  (-0.73)  -0.582  (-2.04)**
US_R144A  0.974  (4.94)***  -0.265  (-0.24)  -1.044  (-2.46)**  1.718  (5.91)***
Controls                 
HOME_CURR  0.906  (10.85)*** 1.506  (3.37)***  1.325  (3.80)***  -0.111  (-0.19) 
                 
Currency Dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Year Dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry Dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Summary Statistics                 
Observations  4634    408    815    1009   
Wald .
2  949.1***    71.3***   129.5***   269.0***   
Pseudo R
2  0.23    0.19    0.18    0.26   
The sample consists of 4634 straight/fixed Eurobonds issued by non-financial firms between 1993 and 2003. Reg 2 
includes only legacy currency Eurobonds (N=408), Reg 3 only Euro denominated Eurobonds (N=815) and Reg 4 only 
U.S. Dollar denominated Eurobonds (N=1009). The dependent variable is the indicator for ‘local’ underwriters
CURR_UW that takes the value of unity when the underwriter’s nationality is the currency of denomination’s home
nation. The ISSUE_SIZE is the real issue size, while the CURR_VOL is real volume of new issues denominated in the
Eurobond’s currency of denomination in the past 12 months. INVGR and NR_RATE are indicator variables for
investment grade and ‘Not rated’ issues respectively. Ln(Mat) is the natural log of maturity, PRIVPL takes the value 
of unity for private placements and zero otherwise and US_R144a is an indicator variable that takes the value of unity
if the Eurobond is distributed to U.S. investors under SEC Rule 144a. HOME_CURR is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of unity where the currency of denomination is the issuer’s parent’s home currency. All regressions
include unreported indicator variables for the currency of denomination, the year of the issue and the first digit of the 
issuer’s parent’s SIC code. The model is estimated using logit regression. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the
99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals respectively. Source: Thomsons Deals.  
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Table V   
Multivariate Underwriter Gross Spread Regression with Endogenous ‘Local’ Underwriter Choice Results 
   REG 1  REG 2  REG 3  REG 4 
INDEPENDENT  VARIABLES  Coef  T-stat  Coef  T-stat  Coef  T-stat  Coef  T-stat 
Constant  171.66  (19.21)*** 170.96 (19.08)*** 170.61 (19.08)***  171.29 (19.16)*** 
‘Local’ Underwriter Choice                         
Pr(CURR_UW)  -0.346  (-2.70)***  -0.370 (-2.84)***  -0.478 (-3.47)***  -0.384 (-2.93)*** 
Pr(CURR_UW)*PRIV_PL        0.119 (1.05)             
Pr(CURR_UW)*UW_REP              0.012 (2.60)***       
Pr(CURR_UW)*HOME_CURR                    0.151  (1.34) 
Currency Segment Liquidity                 
CURR_VOL  -0.036  (-5.38)***  -0.036 (-5.39)***  -0.036 (-5.32)***  -0.036 (-5.34)*** 
Underwriter Competition         
UW_COMP  0.963  (7.04)***  0.966 (7.06)***  0.919 (6.67)***  0.937  (6.78)*** 
Underwriter Reputation                 
UW_REP  0.007  (5.30)***  0.007 (5.30)***  0.000 (0.01)  0.007  (5.34)*** 
Default Risk and Maturity                         
INVGR  -0.931  (-21.05)*** -0.933 (-21.07)*** -0.934 (-21.12)***  -0.933 (-21.08)***
NR_RATE  -0.866  (-18.42)*** -0.867 (-18.44)*** -0.867 (-18.45)***  -0.868 (-18.45)***
LN(MAT)  0.143  (5.97)***  0.141 (5.88)***  0.146 (6.09)***  0.139  (5.78)*** 
Placement Type                         
PRIVPL  -0.111  (-4.16)***  -0.199 (-2.25)**  -0.114 (-4.29)***  -0.108 (-4.04)*** 
Controls                         
HOME_CURR  -0.045  (-1.43)  -0.043 (-1.36)  -0.040 (-1.27)  -0.140 (-1.80)* 
YEAR  -0.085  (-18.96)*** -0.084 (-18.82)*** -0.084 (-18.82)***  -0.085 (-18.90)***
ISSUE_SIZE  0.058  (0.09)  0.138 (0.22)  -0.102 (-0.16)  0.032  (0.05) 
NEW_ISSUER  -0.013  (-0.53)  -0.011 (-0.47)  -0.011 (-0.45)  -0.009 (-0.37) 
CALL_OPTION  -0.249  (-3.11)***  -0.247 (-3.08)***  -0.245 (-3.06)***  -0.248 (-3.10)*** 
                 
Currency Dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Underwriter Dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Summary Statistics                 
Observations  4634     4634     4634     4634    
Adjusted R-Square  0.48     0.48     0.48     0.48    
The model is estimated using 4634 fixed/straight Eurobonds issued by non-financial firms between 1993 and 2003. The 
dependent variable is underwriter gross spread. Pr(CURR_UW) is the endogenous choice of an underwriter of the same 
nationality as the currency of denomination from REG 1 in Table IV. UW_COMP is the Herfindahl index of underwriter
market shares within the currency of denomination in the year prior to the issue. CURR_VOL is the real volume of Eurobond 
issues in the currency of denomination over the past 12 months.  UW_REP is the underwriter reputation league table ranking 
based on the nominal issue amounts in the Eurobond market in the year prior to the issue. PRIVPL is an indicator variable for
private placements. INVGR and NR_RATE takes the value of unity for investment grade issues and for ‘Not Rated’ issues
respectively. Ln(Mat) is the natural log of the year to maturity. YEAR takes the value of the year of the issue, NEW_ISSUER is
an indicator variable where the issuer has not made an issue in the past three years in the Eurobond market. SIZE is the real
issue size and CALL_OPTION is an indicator variable that takes the value of unity if the Eurobond carries a call option.
HOME_CURR is an indicator variable that takes the value of unity if the currency’s domestic market is the same as the issuer’s
parents nationality. All regressions contained unreported indicator variables for the currency of denomination and the
underwriter’s parent’s nationality. The regressions are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote 
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals respectively. Source: Thomsons Deals. 52
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 550
November 2005
Table VI   
Multivariate Underwriter Gross Spread Regression with Endogenous ‘Local’ Underwriter Choice 
Results 
   REG 1  REG 2  REG 3 
INDEPENDENT  VARIABLES  Coef  T-stat  Coef  T-stat  Coef  T-stat 
Constant  173.80  (19.24)*** -20.63  (-0.39)       
‘Local’ Underwriter Choice                   
Pr(CURR_UW)  -0.39  (-2.85)***  0.45  (0.80)  -1.33  (-3.51)*** 
Pr(CURR_UW)*LEGACY  0.52  (2.58)***             
Pr(CURR_UW)*EURO  0.11  (0.71)             
HOMEUW_LEGACY      0.08  (0.38)     
NON_HOMEUW_LEGACY      -0.28  (-0.15)     
HOMEUW_EURO      -0.38  (-1.74)*     
NON_HOMEUW_EURO      -0.24  (-0.29)     
Currency Segment Liquidity             
CURR_VOL  -0.04  (-5.33)***  -0.07  (-3.50)***  -0.09  (-4.16)*** 
Underwriter Competition         
UW_COMP  0.89  (6.45)***  -2.35  (-4.63)***  2.82  (6.61)*** 
Underwriter Reputation                 
UW_REP  0.01  (5.46)***  0.00  (0.72)  0.01  (3.04)*** 
Default Risk and Maturity                   
INVGR  -0.93  (-20.99)*** -0.80  (-4.36)***  -2.25  (-13.85)***
NR_RATE  -0.87  (-18.44)*** -0.68  (-3.47)***  -1.89  (-11.14)***
LN(MAT)  0.14  (5.95)***  0.15  (1.30)  1.19  (15.34)***
Placement Type                   
PRIVPL  -0.11  (-4.08)***  -0.34  (-1.46)  -0.37  (-4.26)*** 
Controls                   
HOME_CURR  -0.05  (-1.68)*      -0.17  (-1.80)* 
YEAR  -0.09  (-18.99)*** 0.01  (0.44)  -0.26  (-18.32)***
ISSUE_SIZE  -0.17  (-0.28)  -1.82  (-0.66)  -2.15  (-1.08) 
NEW_ISSUER  -0.01  (-0.38)  0.01  (0.10)  -0.08  (-0.85) 
CALL_OPTION  -0.25  (-3.07)***      -1.05  (-4.29)*** 
US_UW_LEGACY  0.18  (2.29)**         
US_UW_EURO  0.17  (3.32)***         
              Currency Dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Underwriter Dummies  Yes    No    Yes   
Summary Statistics             
Observations  4634     366     4634    
Adjusted R-Square  0.48     0.43       
Pseudo R-Square           0.23    
The sample consists of 4634 fixed/straight Eurobonds issued by non-financial firms between 1993 and 2003. The 
dependent variable in REG 1 and 2 is underwriter gross spread, UW_SPREAD. The dependent variable in REG 3 is 
ORDERED_FEE that takes the value of 0 to 5 based on UW_SPREAD. Pr(CURR_UW) is the continuous predicted
measure of CURR_UW from REG 1 in Table IV. UW_COMP is the Herfindahl index of underwriter market shares
within the currency of denomination in the year prior to the issue while CURR_VOL is the real volume of Eurobond 
issues in the currency of denomination over the past 12 months.  UW_REP is the underwriter reputation league table 
ranking based on the nominal issue amounts in the Eurobond market in the year prior to the issue. PRIVPL is an 
indicator variable for private placements. INVGR and NR_RATE takes the value of unity for investment grade issues
and for ‘Not Rated’ issues respectively. Ln(Mat) is the natural log of the year to maturity. YEAR takes the value of the 
year of the issue, NEW_ISSUER is an indicator variable where the issuer has not made an issue in the past three years
in the Eurobond market. SIZE is the real issue size and CALL_OPTION is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
unity if the Eurobond carries a call option. HOME_CURR is an indicator variable that takes the value of unity if the
currency’s domestic market is the same as the issuer’s parents nationality. All regressions contained unreported
indicator variables for the currency of denomination and the underwriter’s parent’s nationality. The REG 1 and 2 are
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares, while REG 3 is estimated using Ordered Logit. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote 
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals respectively. Source: Thomsons Deals. 53
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